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breed was more conﬁdent in foreign
policy. On taking ofﬁce in October 1998,
the red/green government under
Schröder was faced with a looming crisis
in Kosovo resulting in NATO’s military
intervention against Slobodan Milosevic
in the spring of 1999. 
Germany’s involvement marked the
ﬁrst aggressive use of its forces since the
Second World War. Since then, the
country’s role in military crisis
management has grown signiﬁcantly.
Successive defence ministers have begun
reforming the army for territorial
defence, changing it into a modern
mobile force capable of working
alongside NATO and EU allies.
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G
ermany’s foreign
policy has lacked clear
direction in recent
years, having veered
away from its traditional
adept approach of
balancing European and
transatlantic interests.
This lack of direction
emerged during former Chancellor
Gerhard Schröder’s second term in ofﬁce
and the controversy over the Iraq war.
Schröder’s premature veto of
involvement in military operations
against Saddam Hussein in September
2002 marginalised Berlin, leaving it with
little or no inﬂuence over the United
States and many European Union
member states. 
Since Angela Merkel’s narrow victory
in the federal elections last September
and the formation of a grand coalition
government with the Social Democratic
Party, Germany has begun to mend
relationships with its key partners –
notably the US and Britain. As a result,
Merkel is enjoying something of a
honeymoon and Berlin’s inﬂuence in
international affairs is recovering. 
The Chancellor’s role in brokering a
budget deal among EU member states at
the closing summit of the British
European Council Presidency last
December, her successful visits to
Washington, and tougher line on Russia
and China have all won praise. 
Generational Change
The 1998 federal elections marked a
generational change in German politics.
Gone were the post-war politicians,
constrained by the weight of history,
embodied by Helmut Kohl. The new
Germany’s new Chancellor, Angela Merkel, ran for ofﬁce on a platform of
domestic reform for the ﬂagging economy. Yet, it is her performance in
foreign policy which has attracted most international attention. After two
visits to Washington this year, the Chancellor is about to cement her
improved relationship by taking President George Bush to her home in the
former communist East Germany.
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Self Conﬁdent
Modesty
Foreign policy has undergone a
strategic shift from a regional focus on
European concerns, towards greater
global engagement. While in ofﬁce, Peter
Struck, a former defence minister in the
Schröder government, declared that
German interests now have to be
defended as far away as the Hindu Kush. 
More than six thousand of the nation’s
troops are involved in crisis management
overseas, most notably in Afghanistan,
where Germany has just taken over
command of the International Security
Assistance Force in the north. This would
have been unthinkable in 1990. 
President Horst Köhler has also been
vocal in outlining the country’s
responsibility in Africa. A sign of this
greater engagement is in the preparations
to be the lead nation in the EU military
force to support forthcoming elections in
the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
However, foreign policy has largely
been reactive to international
developments. Germany has found the
realities of the post-September 11 2001
international environment difﬁcult to
deal with and struggled to inﬂuence
American policy. Lacking the traditional
trappings associated with great powers –
possessing neither nuclear weapons, nor
a permanent seat on the United Nations
Security Council – there are structural
and material limitations on its ability to
unilaterally inﬂuence international affairs. 
This is also linked to the traditional
reserve of foreign policy elites. In a
recent interview, Foreign Minister Frank-
Walter Steinmeier characterised the style
of German foreign policy as driven by
‘self-conﬁdent modesty’. Despite this,
Germany remains a leading international
player because of its economic size and
its ability to inﬂuence its multilateral
partners in the EU, NATO and the UN.
Backing Business
There is a rationale for increased
engagement in world affairs: Germany
needs to develop a clearer global foreign
policy vision to protect its thriving export
industry. Bolstering relations with prime
export markets will require Merkel to
continue an active foreign policy in
conjunction with the EU. 
An export-led domestic recovery will
depend on securing energy supplies to
feed industry. This has been a major
factor in recent agreements with Russia
under both Merkel and Schröder. 
Merkel has been more vocal in
reiterating the obligations Russia and
China have as emerging players in the
global economy. On a recent visit to
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China, the Chancellor raised concerns of
industrialists and investors, reminding
Beijing of its commitments as a member
of the World Trade Organization. 
Special
Relationship(s)
The Chancellor must position foreign
policy to once again moderate between
the extremes of Atlanticism and
Europeanism. Her ﬁrst visit to
Washington in January signalled an intent
to draw a line under tensions evident in
the Schröder/Bush relationship and to
work towards surer foundations. 
Regaining Germany’s role as a
traditional balancer in the transatlantic
community is important for Berlin’s
credibility in international affairs and to
reinvigorate German-American relations.
From Britain’s perspective, improved
German-American relations will lessen
its exposure to criticism within the EU
for being too Atlanticist and greatly ease
efforts by France, Germany and Britain to
build EU defence policy capabilities.
Greater pragmatism is also needed in
Berlin’s relations with its two key
European partners – Paris and London.
On the issue of Iran’s emerging nuclear
programme, Germany has managed to get
a seat at the table, despite not being a
permanent member of the Security
Council. This stems from its role in the
development of the EU’s Common
Foreign and Security Policy which has
bolstered its diplomacy. Cohesion on the
Iran issue between the EU3 – France,
Germany, Britain – has been in marked
contrast to the divisions over Iraq, and
offers hope for greater European foreign
policy cooperation. 
Merkel has already signalled her intent
to loosen the exclusivity of Franco-
German relations to include Britain. For
his part British Prime Minister Tony Blair
has called for relations based on ‘alliance
and friendship – not rivalry’. 
The Chancellor has what neither
French President Jacques Chirac nor Blair
has – momentum. With both French and
British leaders seemingly planning for life
after politics, Merkel may have difﬁculty
ﬁnding a partner to work with.
Nevertheless, France and Britain will be
key partners is reviving the EU’s ﬂagging
economy, although Blair’s vision of
market-led reforms clashes with Franco-
German preferences.
Growing Pragmatism
If Germany is to become more
inﬂuential, the EU will be a central forum
for its increased leadership. European
policy has been characterised by greater
pragmatism in recent years as a result of
the difﬁcult economic climate. 
Germany may have regained its
title as world champion exporter, but
continues to suffer from very high
unemployment – around ﬁve million
people and over twelve percent of the
working-age population. 
Poor economic performance has led to
a shrinking of the space to manoeuvre to
reach agreements in the EU. While
Merkel was able to use German funds to
placate Poland in an overall EU budget
agreement under the British Presidency,
gone are the days of chequebook
diplomacy. European policy under
Schröder and now Merkel has been
marked by growing conditionality in
forging agreements, evident in foot-
dragging over the Services Directive,
which aims to free service companies to
operate across the Union.
The country’s proﬁle in European
policy is set to rise as it takes over the
European Council Presidency and 
the G8 in the ﬁrst half of next year. 
Berlin has yet to outline a concrete
agenda, but consolidation, rather than 
a grand integrationist vision, is likely 
to be the hallmark. 
Merkel has been vocal in her calls for
a revival of the European Constitution
after the failed French and Dutch
referendums, and this would be a sizeable
achievement. For this, Merkel will have to
outline a coherent European agenda 
to address current economic and 
political weaknesses. 
Another key issue will be enlargement,
not only with the inclusion of Romania
and probably Bulgaria, but also offering
prospective membership to Croatia and
other Balkan states. Privileging Balkan
states over Turkey may prove a very
difﬁcult line to tread, given the
Chancellor’s scepticism of Turkish 
EU membership.
Germany will need to confront its
domestic economic fragility if it is to free
signiﬁcant resources to play a more
inﬂuential role internationally. The grand
coalition has made a start through its
Agenda 2010 and Harz IV reform
programmes and there are signs of
improvement sparked by strong export
ﬁgures. But talk of a resurgent Germany
is a little premature. 
The major challenges will be
inﬂuencing the international 
response to Iran’s nuclear programme
and offering a vision for the EU’s future
which is accepted by the overwhelming
majority of member states. These 
will not be easy for a Chancellor who
showed no inclination for foreign policy
on taking ofﬁce, but her Presidency 
of the EU and the G8 next year will
position Merkel at the centre of
these discussions.
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